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MEASURING PEARSON IN THE CIRCUITS
Ted Sampsell-Jones* & Jenna Yauch**
INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity analysis is divided into two prongs: a merits prong,
which considers whether a constitutional right was violated, and an
immunity prong, which considers whether the officer’s conduct was entitled
to qualified immunity. 1
Even if an officer’s conduct violates a
constitutional right, qualified immunity protects him from civil liability if
the right was not so clearly established that it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.2
In 2001, in Saucier v. Katz, 3 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court required
that these two prongs be analyzed in the “proper” order. 4 Courts first had to
determine whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right,
and then decide whether that right was clearly established. 5 This sequential
determination was intended to further the development of the law—or
rather, to prevent courts from depriving the law of explication of
constitutional rights. 6 The Saucier approach to qualified immunity largely
reflected the approach advocated by our co-panelist Dean John Jeffries in
his seminal article The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law. 7
Eight years later in Pearson v. Callahan,8 however, the Court retreated
from Saucier. 9 Another unanimous court held that the Saucier order was no
longer mandatory. 10 The Court’s retreat was a response to lower courts’
difficulty applying the mandatory Saucier framework. 11 It was also a
response to a growing body of criticism of Saucier, perhaps none more
influential than that of our co-panelist, Judge Pierre Leval. 12 Heeding that
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Helen Meyer, Minnesota Supreme Court.
1. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)).
2. See id. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); id. at 232
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
3. 533 U.S. 194.
4. Id. at 200.
5. Id. at 200, 202.
6. Id. at 201.
7. 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999).
8. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
9. Id. at 236.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 234–35.
12. Id. (citing Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275, 1277 (2006)).
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criticism, Pearson made the two-step framework optional. The Pearson
Court instructed that lower courts “exercise their sound discretion” in
determining which of the Saucier prongs to address first and the necessity
of analyzing both prongs instead of the determinative one alone.13
Functionally, Pearson gave courts four options for adjudicating qualified
immunity cases. Under Saucier, qualified immunity cases could be
resolved in only three ways:
Type A:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

Type B:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

Type C:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

no constitutional
violation, and
a fortiori, qualified
immunity

→ Defendant wins.

constitutional violation,
but
qualified immunity

→ Defendant wins.

constitutional violation,
and
no qualified immunity

→ Plaintiff wins.

By rendering Prong One optional, Pearson created a fourth ruling:
Type D:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

skipped with no holding,
and
qualified immunity

→ Defendant wins.

The Type D alternative renders Type A and B rulings purely optional and
discretionary. Under Pearson, courts issuing a Type A or B ruling could
issue a Type D ruling instead. Type A and B rulings, however, involve
“unnecessary” decisions on Prong One—whether the defendant’s conduct
violated the law—because in all such cases, the result is the same. When a
court issues a Type A, B, or D ruling, the defendant wins on Prong Two—
whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The difference has
to do with future cases. Prong One rulings may set broad precedent for
future cases, while Prong Two rulings do not (or at least they have much
narrower precedential effect). In other words, Type A and B rulings have
prospective effect—“unnecessary” prospective effect—while Type D
rulings do not. Saucier mandated prospective rulings; Pearson made them
optional.
In this Essay, we seek to assess whether and why lower courts exercise
that option. We seek to provide preliminary answers to two questions.
First, to what extent are lower courts exercising their discretion to issue
prospective rulings? In other words, to what extent are lower courts
13. Id. at 236.
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choosing Type A or B rulings, and to what extent are they choosing Type D
rulings? Second, what motivates courts to choose one type over another?
In other words, why do courts issue Type A or B rulings when they could
choose Type D, and vice versa?
To answer these questions, we examined every published circuit court
case citing Pearson during the calendar years 2009 and 2010. The universe
consisted of 190 cases. Our findings suggest that in most cases, lower
courts continue to follow the sequenced Saucier framework and continue to
issue Prong One rulings even when they are not necessary to the result. Our
findings also suggest that lower courts generally choose from available
options based on the same sort of pragmatic concerns identified in Pearson.
On the whole, lower courts’ application of Pearson has not been
particularly political, nor has it been driven by theoretical worries about
dicta and advisory opinions.
I. LOWER COURTS’ DESCRIPTIONS OF PEARSON
Lower courts have described their new Pearson-derived discretion in
varying terms. Some cases suggest that optional Prong One rulings are
disfavored, while other cases suggest that they are favored. Put differently,
some cases suggest that courts should generally issue Type D nonprospective rulings when possible, while others suggest that they should
generally issue Type A or B prospective rulings.
The language of Pearson itself was almost studiously neutral—the
Supreme Court’s retreat from Saucier was cautious. The Court noted that it
would still be beneficial to use the Saucier order in many cases, and
reiterated that Saucier’s prescribed order would promote the development
of precedent. 14 Analyzing qualified immunity per Saucier’s sequence
remained “especially valuable with respect to questions that do not
frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is
unavailable.” 15 The Court thus suggested that unnecessary Type A and B
rulings would be valuable in many instances. On the other hand, the Court
also noted that an optional framework was preferable for many reasons: it
would conserve judicial resources, avoid decisions based on an
underdeveloped record, and decrease the occurrence of decisions with no
opportunity for appellate review. 16 Therefore, the Court suggested that
Type D rulings would be prudent in many instances. 17
Pearson’s even-handed treatment of Saucier left courts uncertain about
how to characterize the relationship between the two cases. Courts even
use varying labels to describe Pearson’s relation to Saucier in citations.
Many courts parenthetically cite Pearson as overruling Saucier in part.18
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 236–41.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Lutchel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilkinson v.
Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1022
(9th Cir. 2010); Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 805 (8th Cir.
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Others say it abrogated Saucier. 19 The Ninth Circuit explained that
Pearson “receded from” Saucier. 20
Their textual descriptions of the Pearson-Saucier relationship are equally
diverse. Most contain more nuance than simply calling Saucier overruled.
Some cases describe Pearson as relaxing Saucier’s requirements. 21 Others
portray the relationship as one of modification.22 Taking a more animated
approach, the Tenth Circuit wrote that Pearson “jettisoned” Saucier’s
holding that courts must rule on whether the alleged rights were violated
before ruling on whether they were clearly established.23 The same Circuit
also described Pearson as “discard[ing]” Saucier’s “mechanical[]”
approach. 24 In contrast, some courts have emphasized how much Pearson
left unchanged. The Eleventh Circuit noted that Pearson “reaffirmed the
long-established standard for qualified immunity” and only removed a
requirement as to order. 25
A few cases suggested reading Pearson as giving a firm prescription for
one type of ruling over another. In two separate opinions, for example,
Tenth Circuit Judge Timothy Tymkovich declared he was “tak[ing] the
advice of Pearson” and declining to analyze whether a complaint alleged a
constitutional violation. 26 In each case, the district court had denied the
defendants’ claims of qualified immunity. 27 Judge Tymkovich recognized
that Courts of Appeals needed to address both prongs to affirm the ruling,
but only one to reverse it. 28 Having decided at the outset to reverse the
lower courts’ determination that the officer did not have immunity, Judge
Tymkovich leaned on the “advice” of Pearson in focusing on Prong Two
alone.
Following Pearson’s lead, however, most circuit court explanations of
Pearson’s effect are neutral in tone. 29 One representative court explained
that Pearson allows courts to “bypass the initial step” in the qualified
immunity analysis. 30 Another court focused on the fact that Pearson allows
courts the “analytical flexibility” to focus on the determinative prong of
2010); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); Collier v. Montgomery,
569 F.3d 214, 217 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2009).
19. See, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010); Rohrbough v. Hall,
586 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2009).
20. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 2010).
21. See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 610 F.3d 877, 883 n.8 (5th Cir. 2010); Kennedy v.
City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2010).
22. See, e.g., Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010);
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 526 (1st Cir. 2009).
23. Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2009).
24. Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009).
25. McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009).
26. Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010); see also
Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199).
27. See Clark, 625 F.3d at 689; Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199.
28. See Clark, 625 F.3d at 690 (quoting Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199).
29. See, e.g., Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2010); Nielander v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009); Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd.
of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2010).
30. Cortés-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2010).
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qualified immunity, which sometimes means an analysis of Prong One is
unnecessary. 31 Courts’ appreciation for the flexibility that Pearson granted
them is evident in the frequent citations to Pearson’s “sound discretion”
language. 32 The D.C. Circuit waxed positive on “the Pearson option,”
finding that Saucier made constitutional questions unavoidable, which is no
longer the case under Pearson. 33 The Fifth Circuit expressed its gratitude
for the Pearson “short-cut,” which relieves courts from “undertaking the
often more difficult task of determining” constitutional violations.34 The
Seventh Circuit likewise expressed appreciation for its new ability to
“sidestep” constitutional questions where appropriate.35
In sum, while a few cases suggest that Pearson favors one approach over
the other, most circuits have maintained that Pearson is neutral. The
developing body of circuit case law mostly suggests that Prong One is
optional and discretionary, and that courts should neither favor nor disfavor
optional prospective rulings.
II. LOWER COURTS’ STATISTICAL USE OF VARIOUS OPTIONS
UNDER PEARSON
A. Methodology
To assess lower courts’ use of the new Pearson framework, we examined
every published circuit court case citing Pearson during the calendar years
2009 and 2010. We excluded cases citing Pearson for reasons unrelated to
qualified immunity. That left 205 cases citing Pearson in cases presenting
questions of qualified immunity. We then classified those cases into one of
the four types of qualified immunity rulings described above.
Although most cases were easily classified into one of the four types,
some cases could not be classified for various reasons. For example, some
cases involved multiple claims of various violations or multiple defendants,
which were not all resolved the same way. In such cases, a court might
allow some claims to proceed, but dismiss others under either Prong One or
Prong Two. In such “mixed” cases, if a certain type of result predominated,
we classified the case as that type; if no particular type predominated, we
excluded it from the sample.
Additionally, some courts essentially merged the two prongs, making it
difficult or impossible to classify which prong was outcome-determinative.
For example, in cases centering on alleged illegal searches and seizures,
which turned on the existence of probable cause, some courts stated that the
ultimate resolution depended on whether there was “arguable probable
cause.” 36 Technically, the Prong One analysis requires that an officer have
31.
32.
2009).
33.
34.
35.
36.

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., Krainski, 616 F.3d at 968; Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir.
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Morgan v. Swanson, 627 F.3d 170, 176 n.8 (5th Cir. 2010).
Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010).

628

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

actual probable cause, while the Prong Two analysis requires only arguable
probable cause. In practice, courts occasionally combine the two prongs.
The resulting rulings suggested that an officer had actual probable cause
with a conclusion of this sort: “[W]e find that [the officer] had, at
minimum, arguable probable cause to issue the arrest affidavit of the
Plaintiff.” 37 A few such cases were also excluded from the sample. After
excluding a small percentage of these unclassifiable cases, we were left
with a usable universe of 190 cases.
B. Overall Rates of Ruling Types
Of those 190 cases that could be classified, the overall usage of the four
possible rulings after Pearson was as follows:

Type A:

Type B:

Table 1: Post-Pearson Rulings by Type 38
Prong One:
no constitutional
violation, and
Prong Two:
a fortiori, qualified
immunity
→ Defendant wins.
Prong One:
Prong Two:

Type C:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

Type D:

Prong One:
Prong Two:

34.7%

constitutional
violation, but
qualified immunity

→ Defendant wins.

7.9%

constitutional
violation, and
no qualified
immunity

→ Plaintiff wins.

37.9%

skipped with no
holding, and
qualified immunity

→ Defendant wins.

19.5%

Of course, Type C rulings are substantially irrelevant to the questions
addressed in this Essay because Pearson did not alter them in any important
way. A ruling that a defendant violated clearly established law in Prong
Two necessarily involves a ruling that the defendant violated that law in
Prong One. Simply put, when a court rules for the plaintiff, it must reach
the first prong. Because Type C rulings do not involve any Pearsonderived discretion, we can exclude them to focus on the universe of cases
that do.
The relevant universe includes Type A, B, and D rulings—i.e., cases
where the defendant prevailed. Within that universe, the overall usage of
each type broke down as follows:

37. Id.
38. See Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson Survey Results
(unpublished spreadsheet) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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Table 2: Post-Pearson Results Excluding Type C Rulings 39
Type A: 55.9%
Type B: 12.7%
Type D: 31.4%

Thus, in cases where courts had an option of issuing a ruling on Prong
One, they exercised that option in approximately two-thirds of cases. In
other words, about 68.6% of such cases (Type A plus Type B) resulted in
unnecessary prospective rulings, and about 31.4% skipped directly to Prong
Two. On the whole, it appears that courts continued to follow the Saucier
sequence most of the time, although they exercised their Pearson discretion
in a substantial minority of cases.
C. Rates by Party Affiliation
We next attempted to discern whether judges’ political affiliation had a
discernible effect on their use of the various qualified immunity ruling
types. 40 Among circuit panels with a majority of Republican-appointed
judges, the overall usage rates were:
Table 3: Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority
of Republican-Appointed Judges 41
Type A: 37.1%
Type B: 6.4%
Type C: 36.4%
Type D: 20.0%

Excluding Type C cases, panels controlled by Republican appointees had
the following rates:
Table 4: Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority
of Republican-Appointed Judges, Excluding Type C Rulings 42
Type A: 58.4%
Type B: 10.1%
Type D: 31.5%

For panels with a majority of Democrat-appointed judges, the overall
rates were:

39. See id.
40. Of the 190 cases included in these results, 145 were decided by panels with a
majority of Republican appointees and 60 were decided by panels with a majority of
Democrat appointees. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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Table 5: Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority
of Democrat-Appointed Judges 43
Type A: 28.0%
Type B: 12.0%
Type C: 42.0%
Type D: 18.0%

Considering only cases involving Pearson discretion, panels controlled
by Democratic appointees ruled as follows:
Table 6: Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority
of Democrat-Appointed Judges, Excluding Type C Rulings 44
Type A: 48.3%
Type B: 20.7%
Type D: 31.0%

Thus, Republican-appointee-controlled panels issued unnecessary Prong
One rulings in 68.5% of cases and Democratic-appointee-controlled panels
issued them in 69.0% of cases. That difference does not appear significant.
The greatest distinction was that Democratic-appointed judges appeared to
be more likely to find that a defendant violated the law (i.e., Type B plus
Type C). Democratic-appointee-controlled panels found Prong One
violations in 54.0% of cases, while panels controlled by Republican
appointees found them in 42.9% of cases. Even that statistical difference,
however, is fairly small.
III. STATED RATIONALES AND EXAMPLES OF VARIOUS TYPES
A. Rationales for Exercising Pearson Discretion
We next examined lower courts’ stated rationales for either issuing or
forgoing a Prong One ruling. Overall, their rationales were pragmatic and
grounded in the Supreme Court’s guidance in Pearson. Circuit courts have
been particularly willing to issue unnecessary Prong One rulings in
situations where there was a paucity of precedent on the constitutional issue
presented and the need for such a ruling seemed great.
For example, the Ninth Circuit followed the Saucier order in al-Kidd v.
Ashcroft. 45 It explained that Saucier’s sequence was “especially valuable in
addressing constitutional questions” that would not only arise infrequently,
but would likely be resolved by qualified immunity precisely due to the
There, the court considered the
lack of pertinent case law. 46
constitutionality of former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s decision to
confine United States citizens pursuant to the Federal Material Witness
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.
See id.
580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
Id. at 964.
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Statute, without charging them with any crimes. 47 Although the court
eventually decided that Ashcroft was not protected by any kind of
immunity, the court decided that it should confront the Prong One issue—
regardless of the resolution of Prong Two—to provide guidance to future
courts confronted with similar legal issues. 48
Other circuit panels also have deemed the Saucier order appropriate in
other cases of first impression. For example, a different Ninth Circuit panel
used the Saucier framework because it had not previously addressed
whether police could rely on the statement of a very young victim as the
sole fact supporting their seizure of a suspected child molester. 49 Another
panel found it beneficial to follow the Saucier sequence to address, for the
first time, the constitutional standards governing an in-school seizure of a
student allegedly abused by her father. 50
The Second Circuit has similarly employed the Saucier order to advance
the development of the law. In Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 51 the court
chose to answer the threshold inquiry about the constitutionality of clothing
exchange procedures in jails, even though it was not required to do so.52
Although many district courts in the circuit had spoken on the issue, the
Court of Appeals had not, and it decided to confront the issue because
development of constitutional precedent was important.53 The court was
aware that the issue may never be settled if it were to continually hold that
the law was not clearly established and grant defendants immunity on that
ground. 54
Considering Prong One did not burden the Kelsey court because the
discussion of one prong necessarily overlapped with the other. 55 The court
noted that there was no reason to abstain from performing the Prong One
analysis since analyzing the reasons why the law was not clearly established
also demonstrated why no violation was alleged.56 Other courts also have
determined that the Saucier order actually saved them time—a rejoinder to
those who say discarding the two-part test is a huge boon for judicial
resources. The Seventh Circuit reported that the Saucier order “facilitates
. . . expeditious disposition” in certain cases. 57
Courts skipping Prong One have likewise justified their decision to do so
with the pragmatic reasons that Pearson endorsed. They quite frequently
explained this choice in terms straight out of Pearson, and collectively they
have used nearly every rationale the Supreme Court relied on in overturning
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009).
50. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 131 S.
Ct. 2020 (2011).
51. 567 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2009).
52. Id. at 61.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 61–62.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Akande v. Grounds, 555 F.3d 586, 590 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009).
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the mandatory nature of Saucier. Some circuit panels explained that, given
the freedom to address either prong first, they simply focused on the
determinative one. 58 The Eleventh Circuit expressed a belief that analyzing
Prong Two only was the “‘best [way to] facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition’ of [the] case.” 59 These explanations both fall in line with
Pearson’s remonstrance to save time and money for the parties and courts
where possible. 60 The First Circuit avoided Prong One in Cortés-Reyes v.
Salas-Quintana 61 because it would have been called upon to draw uncertain
conclusions about Puerto Rican law.62 The court based its refusal on
Pearson’s admonishment that the goal of developing the law is not
advanced when a federal court must make assumptions about state law to
resolve constitutional issues. 63 The Seventh Circuit found that a Prong One
analysis would serve no jurisprudential purpose because the analysis in that
case would be complicated by its “quirky facts” and, as such, would
provide little guidance for future cases.64 Lower courts have also drawn on
Pearson’s constitutional avoidance rationale.65 The Sixth Circuit relied on
Pearson’s discussion of challenging procedural postures in Koubriti v.
Convertino. 66 Pearson had noted that “the precise factual basis for the
plaintiff’s claim . . . may be hard to identify” at the time an appellate court
rules on qualified immunity. 67 In Koubriti, the Sixth Circuit declined to
address the Prong One question because it had “not been developed in the
lower court record.” 68
Some circuit courts have been willing to admit that, given the freedom to
do so, they simply “bypass the more difficult question,” which is often
whether a constitutional right was violated in Prong One. 69 Despite the
value of developing the law, there are many situations where courts simply
avoid creating new law. This was the case for the Eleventh Circuit when it
confronted the extent of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in email
content. 70 The court noted there were few circuit decisions regarding
Fourth Amendment protection of email content and that the Supreme Court
had not spoken on privacy expectations in electronic communications.71
58. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir.
2009).
59. Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Decosta, 587 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009)).
60. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237.
61. 608 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2010).
62. See id. at 51–52.
63. See id. at 51 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238).
64. Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).
65. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We thus follow the
‘older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such
adjudication is unavoidable.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S.
at 241)).
66. 593 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).
67. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238–39.
68. Koubriti, 593 F.3d at 471.
69. Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2009).
70. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 846 (11th Cir. 2010).
71. See id. at 843–44.
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The court concluded that the prudent choice was to decline to set precedent,
particularly because it would not be essential to the outcome of the case.72
The Tenth Circuit perhaps summed it up best:
To attempt to answer Saucier’s first question would require us to opine on
an open and significant issue of constitutional law on an inadequate
record, without benefit either of a district court holding or of relevant
briefing, even though the issue would have no effect on the outcome of
the case. We therefore exercise our newfound discretion and move on. 73

B. Example: Type B
Type B holdings are the least frequent of the four post-Pearson types.74
It is relatively rare for courts to find that a defendant violated the law but
also that the defendant is entitled to immunity. At least occasionally,
however, circuit courts take that path, which is where the “prospectiveonly” aspect of Saucier is most obvious. Type B rulings essentially hold
that this particular defendant escapes without liability, but all future
defendants who engage in similar conduct will be liable.75 Some courts
explicitly choose this prospective option.
Stoot v. City of Everett was one such case. 76 The mother of a four-yearold girl, A.B., reported to the police that her daughter had been sexually
abused by a fourteen-year-old boy, Paul Stoot. 77 An officer, Jensen,
responded to the call and interviewed A.B. about the alleged abuse.78
Jensen determined that A.B.’s story was credible and, without further
investigation or corroboration, headed to Stoot’s school to seize and
interrogate him. 79 Stoot later alleged that the interrogation at the school
was coercive—that Jensen threatened him, offered incentives for Stoot to
confess, and engaged in “blaming the victim” strategies designed to elicit
inculpatory statements.80 Stoot eventually gave in and confessed to several
acts of sexual abuse against A.B. Jensen had Stoot write and sign a
confession. 81
The district court eventually dismissed all charges against Stoot, finding
both that the confession was coerced and that A.B. was not credible.82
Stoot’s family then filed a § 1983 suit, claiming several constitutional
violations, including that Jensen seized Stoot without probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 83 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the law was not clearly established such that Jensen was on notice that
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 846.
Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009).
See supra tbl.1.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 914–15.
Id. at 915–17.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916–17.
Id. at 917.
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his actions were unlawful, entitling him to qualified immunity. 84 Along the
way to this holding, however, the court took a purposeful path to clarify the
law. Because the court had not previously ruled on whether a statement of
a very young victim of alleged sexual abuse could establish probable cause
on its own, the court chose to address the issue under Prong One. 85
To resolve this issue of first impression, the court first relied on
precedent holding that crime victims’ statements cannot alone support a
finding of probable cause if the victims are not reasonably trustworthy or
reliable. 86 Applying this rule to the new fact scenario—a very young
victim of alleged sexual abuse—the court found three factors weighed
against the trustworthiness of A.B.’s statement.87 First, A.B. was only four
years old and the abuse was alleged to have taken place over a year before it
was reported. 88 Second, A.B. changed her answers several times
throughout the interview with Jensen.89 Third and finally, A.B. confused
Stoot with another boy during Jensen’s interview. 90 Taken together, these
three factors swayed the court’s determination that A.B.’s testimony was
not trustworthy enough to establish probable cause on its own. 91 Thus
Jensen seized Stoot without probable cause and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 92
Although the court did not set a bright-line rule against the reliability of
child victim statements, the analysis provides guidance for future courts
faced with probable cause determinations based on child victim statements.
The court also used the Stoot case as an opportunity to distinguish Tenth
Circuit precedent on the same issue. Jensen had relied on Easton v. City of
Boulder 93 to support his claim that internally conflicting statements of child
victims can establish probable cause.94 Easton similarly involved an
allegation of child sexual abuse where the suspect’s seizure was based, in
part, on the victim’s statements. 95 When Easton brought suit challenging
the reliability of the statement used by police, the Tenth Circuit held that
reliance on the victim’s statements was reasonable despite internal
inconsistencies. 96 Moreover, the Easton Court repudiated a per se rule that
statements of very young child victims cannot be relied upon in probable
cause determinations.97 Jensen attempted to cite Easton for the proposition
that police may reasonably rely solely on a child victim’s partially

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 922.
Id. at 918 n.8.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1985).
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920.
Easton, 776 F.2d at 1443–46.
Id. at 1449.
Id.
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conflicting statements.98 The Stoot court recognized that Easton did so
hold, but decided the Tenth Circuit case was distinguishable on the basis of
corroboration. 99 In Easton, the police had corroborating evidence in the
form of another child’s statement, physical evidence, and information about
Easton himself. 100 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that Easton was of
no avail to Jensen, who sought a holding that uncorroborated child victim
statements alone sufficed for probable cause.101 Easton did not go that far,
according to the Ninth Circuit.
By taking the time to explicate Prong One in Stoot, the Ninth Circuit
demonstrated exactly what Saucier promoted—and what Pearson
potentially lost. The court found Jensen was immune to the Fourth
Amendment challenge because the Stoots could cite no case law putting
him on notice that his actions were unlawful. 102 The Ninth Circuit could
have rested the entire decision there. Instead, by creating new law, the
court essentially put every other officer in the circuit on notice that relying
only on uncorroborated and unreliable statements of very young sexual
abuse victims to establish probable cause is a constitutional violation, and
qualified immunity would no longer protect them if they did that. Perhaps
the decision to analyze Prong One in Stoot was political, because the circuit
panel was controlled by Democrat appointees and our survey demonstrated
a slight Democratic-appointee preference for finding that officers
committed constitutional violations.103 Perhaps the panel sought to restrain
the actions of police officers by delineating a new constitutional rule.
Regardless, it is clear that the court made a purposeful choice to clarify the
law.
C. Example: Type D
Of the cases we studied, just over one-third resulted in a Type D ruling.
These courts chose to exercise the freedom Pearson gave them and avoid
the Prong One analysis entirely. Christensen v. Park City Municipal
Corp. 104 is a representative example of a Type D case. Shaun Christensen
was a visual artist who attempted to display and sell his artwork on public
property in Park City, Utah. 105 Christensen was arrested for violating a city
ordinance requiring a license to conduct business outdoors.106 After the
charges against Christensen were eventually dropped, he filed a civil suit

98. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 921.
99. Id.
100. Easton, 776 F.2d at 1443–44.
101. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 921.
102. Id. at 922.
103. Compare supra tbl.5 (showing that Democrat-appointee-dominated panels found
constitutional violations in 54.2% of cases—both Type B and C rulings), with supra tbl.3
(demonstrating that Republican-appointee-dominated panels found such violations in only
43.6% of cases).
104. 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
105. Id. at 1273–74.
106. Id. at 1274.
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against the city and the arresting officers claiming a violation of his First
Amendment right to display and sell artwork. 107
The district court dismissed Christensen’s claims against the individual
officers. 108 First, the court found that Christensen’s complaint failed to
state a claim because he did not specify the type of artwork at issue.109
Then, the court denied Christensen leave to amend his complaint because
the law governing the officers’ conduct was not clearly established at the
time of the arrest. 110 Therefore, qualified immunity would protect the
officers from liability even if Christensen remedied the specificity
problem. 111 The district court held that it “‘need not determine the exact
parameters of the First Amendment protection for the sale of expressive
artwork because of the [complaint’s] vagueness’” and the inevitability of
qualified immunity. 112 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling that
Christensen’s complaint did not adequately allege the nature of his
artwork. 113 Like the district court, however, the circuit court refused to
address the possibility of a First Amendment violation because it “would
have been very difficult to do that here.” 114
The difficulties were both legal and practical. Legally, it was unclear
which framework applied to Christensen’s First Amendment claim. 115 The
district court analyzed the violation under the standard set forth in Bery v.
City of New York. 116 Under Bery, artwork that falls within the same
categories as paintings, photographs, prints, or sculptures receives First
Amendment protection as presumptively expressive artwork. 117 Because
the district court and all the parties had assumed that Bery applied, 118 the
court dismissed Christensen’s First Amendment claim because it could not
discern from the complaint whether his artwork fell into one of the Bery
categories. 119 The Tenth Circuit was not convinced that Bery was the
proper standard, however. 120 It suggested that the Park City ordinance’s
prohibitions against selling expressive artwork may be better analyzed “as
restrictions on expressive conduct [under United States v. O’Brien 121]
rather than speech.” 122 The court even noted that some constitutional
analysis other than Bery and O’Brien may apply. 123 Because the parties
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Order at 6, Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-202 (D.
Utah Sept. 15, 2006)).
113. Id. at 1276.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1276–77.
116. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996); see Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1276.
117. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696; see Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1275.
118. Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1276.
119. Id. at 1274.
120. Id. at 1276–77.
121. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
122. Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1277.
123. Id.
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assumed Bery applied, they had not briefed the issue and thus the court
could not easily determine the proper standard.124
Practically, this legally complicated issue was exacerbated by logistical
problems with Christensen’s case. Because the parties had not submitted
briefs on the other legal standards, the court could not determine how they
would apply. 125 For example, the O’Brien standard, unlike Bery,
considered the governmental purposes served by the regulation and the
alternative channels of communication available to Christensen. The
parties’ focus on Bery meant that the court would be faced with an
inadequate record on which to examine those two factors if it had
determined that O’Brien was the correct framework for analyzing the
ordinance. 126 The Tenth Circuit thought it was fortunate that Pearson had
recently obviated the need to analyze Prong One. 127 The court indicated
that Christensen’s case served as an example of when Pearson discretion
should be exercised. 128 The court found that “[i]t would serve no practical
purpose for us to delve any deeper into the First Amendment principles
applicable to this case. . . . [F]urther analysis of the merits would have no
actual consequence for the litigants.”129 Instead, the court chose to analyze
Prong Two alone because it was determinative and relieved the court of the
need to opine on a “significant issue” of constitutional law without the
benefit of briefing or a fully formed record. 130 Perhaps the Christensen
court’s choice to avoid Prong One could be explained by the judges’
political affiliations—the panel was comprised entirely of Republican
appointees 131 and our research revealed that those judges demonstrated a
slight preference for avoiding unnecessary Prong One rulings.132
Nevertheless, the court may have been on target in asserting that the
Christensen case was precisely the sort of situation the Pearson Court
sought to avoid—forcing courts to rule on important constitutional issues in
challenging procedural postures when the result would be non-dispositive.
IV. COMPARISON WITH CASES DECIDED UNDER SAUCIER
A. Statistical Use of Various Options Under Saucier and Pearson
Relying on previous work by other scholars, we can compare courts’ use
of the various ruling types under the Saucier framework with their use
under the Pearson framework. As we discussed above, Saucier permitted
courts to issue only Type A, B, and C rulings, but Pearson enabled them to
issue Type D rulings.
124. Id. at 1276–77.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1277.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1278.
129. Id. at 1277.
130. Id. at 1278.
131. See id. at 1273 (noting that panel consisted of Circuit Judges Terrence O’Brien,
Wade Brorby, and Michael W. McConnell).
132. Compare supra tbl.3, with supra tbl.5.
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Several scholars have previously conducted statistical analyses of the
courts’ rulings under the Saucier framework.
These scholars’
methodologies varied somewhat, as did their results, but overall they
reached roughly consistent conclusions. Paul Hughes examined 158
published appellate cases decided in 2005 under the Saucier framework,133
Nancy Leong analyzed 155 such cases decided in 2006 and 2007, 134 and
Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg analyzed 355 such cases decided
between 2001 and 2008. 135 Their results are summarized and averaged in
the following table:

Type A:
Type B:
Type C:
Type D:

Table 7: Summary of Previous Studies’ Results
Sobolski &
Hughes 136
Leong 137
Steinberg 138
Average 139
42.2%
61.9%
43.6%
47.5%
10.2%
6.5%
13.9%
11.3%
46.4%
26.5%
36.5%
36.5%
1.2%
4.5%
5.9%
4.5%

Two aspects of their collective findings bear particular emphasis. First,
even though Saucier purported to mandate consideration of Prong One—
and thus Type D rulings were not allowed—lower courts still occasionally
issued Type D rulings before Pearson. In other words, in a small but nontrivial number of cases, lower courts ignored Saucier and refused to issue
Prong One rulings. 140 Second, despite Saucier’s focus on enabling Type B
rulings—with their purely prospective adjudications of constitutional
rights—lower courts employed that option relatively rarely. All three
empirical analyses of Saucier-era cases found that the great majority of
cases—around 80%—were either Type A or Type C.
Using averages of previous studies, we can compare Saucier-era results
to our Pearson-era results:
133. Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the
Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 422–23 (2009).
134. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 711 (2009).
135. Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983
Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523,
545 (2010).
136. Hughes, supra note 133, at 423 tbl.1.
137. Leong, supra note 134, at 711 tbl.4.
138. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 135, at 545–46 tbls.1 & 2.
139. These averages are intended to serve as rough estimates for the purposes of
comparing these authors’ findings with our own. They have been weighted according to the
number of cases each study surveyed, but they do not account for the authors’ varying
methodologies or any overlap in the cases examined.
140. Saucier’s mandate, of course, applied equally to district courts and circuit courts. See
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (indicating that the order was an “instruction to
the district courts and courts of appeals”); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195,
198 & n.3 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that the court of appeals followed the Saucier
sequence and that the Court was not “reconsider[ing] [its] instruction in Saucier” in that
case).
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Table 8: Comparison of Saucier-era and Pearson-era Results
Saucier 141
Pearson 142
Change
47.5%
34.7%
-12.8%
11.3%
7.9%
-3.4%
36.5%
37.9%
+1.4%
4.5%
19.5%
+15.0%

The percentage of Type B and C rulings changed only to a small extent,
while the percentage of Type A and D rulings changed substantially. These
results suggest that lower courts under Pearson have not only employed
Type D rulings much more frequently, but more importantly, they suggest
Type D rulings occurred in cases where the courts otherwise would have
issued a Type A ruling. In other words, under Saucier, there were more
cases in which courts issued a Prong One ruling stating that the defendants
had not violated the law, which created harmful precedent for future
plaintiffs and helpful precedent for future defendants. Under Pearson, there
were more cases where courts avoided setting any precedent for future
cases. Because these latter Type D rulings appear to have come largely at
the expense of Type A rulings, Pearson has had the counterintuitive effect
of helping plaintiffs and hurting defendants.
Moreover, these conclusions are generally consistent with those reached
earlier by Nancy Leong. After comparing cases decided under Saucier with
cases decided before Saucier, Leong found that Saucier produced “virtually
no change in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional
violation had taken place and a striking increase in the percentage of cases
where courts held that no constitutional violation had taken place.”143 She
concluded that “the constitutional questions avoided pre-Saucier are now
almost uniformly decided in defendants’ favor.” 144 In other words, she
found that Saucier caused lower courts to substitute Type A rulings for
Type D rulings. Our study confirms her findings on Saucier’s effect. The
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the mandatory sequence in Pearson has
allowed lower courts to revert to their pre-Saucier practice: substituting
Type D rulings for Type A rulings. Leong’s and our conclusions, however,
are not fully consistent with those of Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg.
Although they found that “the transition from pre- to post-Saucier
corresponds to an observable increase in frequency of rights-restricting
holdings in which a court holds the plaintiff has not successfully alleged a
constitutional violation [i.e., Type A rulings],” they concluded that “such
changes [were] not statistically significant.” 145
Ultimately, it may be too early to tell what the effect of Pearson will be.
What seems clear, however, is that the shift from Saucier to Pearson was
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra tbl.7.
See Sampsell-Jones & Yauch, supra note 38.
Leong, supra note 134, at 690.
Id. at 693.
Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 135, at 547.
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not an unambiguous victory for government official defendants. Pearson
may have had little effect, or indeed it may have benefited citizen plaintiffs.
Regardless of Pearson’s ultimate effect, it should not be taken as evidence
that we have a Supreme Court bent on limiting the constitutional rights of
American citizens.
CONCLUSION
As a political matter, Pearson has been alternately hailed and criticized
as a victory for government official defendants over citizen plaintiffs.
Academic commentators have generally assumed that, in the long-run,
Pearson will result in substantially less tort liability for official lawbreakers
because courts will decline to address Prong One issues, and thus officials
will remain indefinitely immune because the law will never be clearly
established.
In reality, such assumptions may be substantially unfounded, and some
of the criticisms overblown. In most cases, courts continue to follow the
ordered Saucier framework even where they are not required to do so.146 In
cases where courts exercised their Pearson discretion and skipped the
Prong One merits analysis, they often do so because the case presents
quirky facts or odd questions of law with limited precedential value.147
Moreover, the data suggest that Democratic-appointed judges are both
somewhat more likely to rule in plaintiffs’ favor and to issue optional Prong
One rulings. 148 In its application, therefore, the optional Pearson
framework has demonstrated a small amount of self-selection bias favoring
citizen plaintiffs.
Conversely, Pearson has proven not to be a great victory for Saucier’s
critics. Those critics had argued that Saucier required courts to write dicta
and issue unconstitutional advisory opinions. 149 Under Pearson, however,
courts generally do the same thing. Courts still regularly issue Type A and
B rulings, 150 both of which involve constitutional rulings that are
technically unnecessary and therefore dicta—at least under certain
(arguably naive and untenable) definitions of dicta. While Pearson has
been cited as a general endorsement of the constitutional avoidance canon,
the fact remains that most lower courts violate that canon regularly under
Pearson. Pearson has not stopped courts from issuing the very type of
prospective rulings that led critics to attack Saucier.
In sum, our analysis of the post-Pearson qualified immunity decisions in
the circuit courts suggests that not much has changed. Pearson reads like a
146. See supra tbls.1 & 2.
147. See supra notes 58–73 and accompanying text.
148. Compare supra tbls.5 & 6, with supra tbls. 3 & 4.
149. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 847, 851–53, 876–881 (2005); Leval, supra note 12, at 1277; see also Melissa
Armstrong, Note, Rule Pragmatism: Theory and Application to Qualified Immunity
Analysis, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 107, 123–28 (2004) (assessing analytic and
functional arguments for considering such unnecessary rulings dicta).
150. See supra tbl.1.

2011]

MEASURING PEARSON IN THE CIRCUITS

641

fairly limited qualification of the Saucier framework, and for the most part,
lower courts have applied it in that spirit. 151 Pearson suggests that in
certain cases, courts should forgo rulings on the merits, but Pearson also
continues to endorse the use of optional rulings on the merits in order to
clarify the law for future cases.152 Pearson allows lower courts to continue
issuing prospective rulings in cases where it makes sense to do so. 153 That
is precisely what lower courts have done.154

151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text; see also tbl.1.

